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RESURRECTING FREE SPEECH
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN*
T is a great honor to be here as the Levine lecturer. I want to ex-
tend my sincerest thanks both to the Law School and to the Levine
family.
In the usual course, death precedes resurrection, and so upon hear-
ing my title, you might object that, after all, free speech is alive and
well. The Supreme Court, you might think, seems to have settled the
free speech controversies that divided it through most of this century.
Earlier in the century, for example, the Court routinely upheld the
prosecution of political dissent. In recent Terms, by contrast, the
Court has routinely upheld the free speech rights of politically obnox-
ious speakers, whether it be a white racist burning a cross or a young
Maoist burning a flag.
The flag-burning and cross-burning cases, you will recall-Texas v.
Johnson,' United States v. Eichman z and R.A. V. v. City of St. PauP-
had more in common with each other than fire. In each of those
cases, the Supreme Court denied the power of government to sup-
press symbolic conduct for its message, no matter how offensive it
might be to people looking on. On the Court, at least, free speech
issues in recent years have commanded a rare political consensus, pro-
ducing even occasional unanimous votes4 and uniting Justices from
Brennan to Scalia.5
Across the land, though, things are not so simple. Across the land,
a sea change has been blowing in the politics of free speech. Just as
the free speech principle seemed to have become settled at the
Supreme Court, it has become unsettled in its intellectual foundations
and in its usual grounds of political support.
In the old days, after all, the First Amendment was a banner that
mostly the left marched under in a struggle against censorship per-
ceived as coming mostly from the right. The Holmes and Brandeis
opinions that founded our modem free speech tradition were written
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1. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
2. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 107 (1991) (unanimously invalidating New York's "Son of
Sam" law, which required escrow of proceeds from writings about crime).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989).
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in cases involving the prosecution of communists, socialists, syndical-
ists, anarchists, pacifists, trade unionists, and assorted other so-called
"reds."6
The American Civil Liberties Union got its start representing trade
unionists and draft resisters. And, after the long drought in free
speech law during the era of McCarthy, it was the civil rights marches,
protests, and sit-ins of the 1950s and 1960s that pioneered much mod-
ern First Amendment ground. The enemies of free speech in these
canonical histories were the forces of law and order, anticommunism,
and Jim Crow.
But today, the First Amendment, once thought of as a judicial de-
vice for rescuing left-wing causes from the jaws of right-wing politics,
is thought by many liberals to do something like the opposite.
Why is that? First, principles of free speech neutrality have ex-
tended First Amendment protection from causes of the political left to
causes of the political right. It was a Ku Klux Klan rally that led the
Court in 1969 finally to put teeth in the "clear and present danger"
test by upholding the right to engage in white supremacist speech.
7
And it was the ACLU's defense of neo-Nazis, who sought to goose-
step in brown shirts past Holocaust survivors in Skokie, Illinois, that
stretched that neutrality principle nearly to the breaking point," cost-
ing the Civil Liberties Union many contributions along the way.
Most recently, the Court unanimously upheld, in the R.A.V case,
the free speech right of a young skinhead to burn a cross in a black
family's backyard. 9 The majority reasoned that such an act may be
punished as trespass, or burglary, or terrorism, or arson, but not as a
symbol arousing racial hatred or alarm.' 0
Second, the Court has tested the politics of free speech by ex-
tending the free speech principle to protect the speech rights of the
wealthy as well as what the Court of the 1930s and 1940s was fond of
calling the "poorly financed causes of little people."" Today, the free
speech principle benefits not only the leaflets of what Justice Holmes
called "poor and puny anonymities,"'12 but also the expensive televi-
sion advertisements of such litigants as the First National Bank of
6. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Holmes, J.); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis,
J.); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by
Brandeis, J.); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring, joined by Holmes, J.); see also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 256 (1937) (re-
versing Gidow).
7. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
8. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
9. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992).
10. See id. at 2541 n.1.
11. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (striking down a ban on
door-to-door distribution of circulars).
12. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Boston. In a case called First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,13
the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute requiring that corpora-
tions abstain from political speech in referendum campaigns.14
In Buckley v. Valeo,"5 the Court likewise struck down Congress's
attempt to place ceilings on the expenditures that candidates or their
supporters could make in political election campaigns. 6 This decision
is part of the reason for today's expensive candidacies, from California
senatorial candidate Michael Huffington to presidential contender
Ross Perot. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court said that redistribution is
not contemplated by the First Amendment; 7 the kind of redistribu-
tion we permit from landlord to tenant or employer to employee does
not extend to those who have unequal wherewithal for speech.
In these decisions, the new free speech critics say, the First Amend-
ment is no longer a force for liberation, but rather, in their view, a tool
for entrenching the status quo. In their view, the time right now for
freedom of speech is something like 1937 was for freedom of contract.
On the advent of the New Deal, the Court finally stopped declaring
the liberty of contract, which it found in the Fourteenth Amendment,
an obstacle to minimum wage, maximum hour, and other redistribu-
five economic laws.' 8 So, too, these new free speech critics say, the
Court should now remove freedom of speech as a constitutional ob-
stacle to the legislative redistribution not of money but of speaking
power.
Sometimes, the new critics say, constitutional liberties undergo
what Professor Jack Balkin calls "an ideological drift."19 Freedom of
contract was one thing to nineteenth-century abolitionists and quite
another to corporations who used it later in that century to constitu-
tionalize a principle of laissez-faire. So too for speech, they say. The
principle that once protected socialists and civil rights marchers has
now come-unfortunately, in their view-to protect skinheads and
wealthy businessmen.
Hence, the current shift among the players on the scorecard of free
speech. It used to be that censorship was associated with the right and
free speech libertarianism with the left. But today, in so many contro-
versies, those political poles have switched. Now we hear new calls
for speech regulation coming from the left and increasing endorse-
ment of free speech from the right.
13. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
14. Id. at 767.
15. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
16. Id. at 58-59.
17. Id. at 48-49.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
19. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism" Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 Duke LJ. 375, 383.
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To illustrate, consider five familiar recent examples under the head-
ings, respectively, of sex, hate, money, and violence.
First, there has been a movement by some feminists to regulate por-
nography as a form of sex discrimination against women, on the the-
ory that sexually explicit magazines and videos treat women as objects
who are subordinate to men.2 0 True, this movement has failed to
achieve any lasting legal victory. Its one successful legislative victory
was thrown out in federal court, on the ground that a law forbidding
the graphic depiction in words or pictures of the sexual subordination
of women amounted, under the First Amendment, to a form of
thought control.2'
But the arguments of these anti-pornography activists have had a
great deal of influence, at least academically, on my second example,
the movement to regulate hate speech-that is, speech that conveys
messages of racial or other group-based inferiority in a persecutory, or
insulting, or degrading way. In common with the anti-pornography
feminists, hate speech regulators view such speech as subordination
and think that more speech-that old common cure for bad speech-
is in these cases an inadequate remedy.' This is not an area, they say,
where we can rely on good counsel to drive out bad.
Advocacy of such hate speech regulation, of course, has split old
liberal coalitions, and opposition to such measures has come largely,
not just from the ACLU, but from many on the political right.
A third example of this phenomenon of the switch in the political
valences of free speech is those calls, again coming largely from the
left, for greater regulation of money in politics. The Supreme Court
has, since the 1970s, recognized what many people already know, that
"money talks." But the Supreme Court held that when money talks,
that "speech" is constitutionally protected. For example, recall the
Buckley and First National Bank cases that I mentioned a moment
ago. The new advocates of campaign finance regulation say that such
decisions gave too much leeway to the distortive political influence of
aggregated wealth.
For a fourth example, consider calls for the curtailment of television
and other media violence coming not only from "family values"
groups and parents' groups, but also from the Democratic administra-
tion, and indeed, last autumn, from the Attorney General herself.2 3
Here the argument, which has affinity with the arguments for hate
20. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life
and Law, 127-210 (1987).
21. American Booksellers Assoc., Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986).
22. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133, 146 (1982).
23. See Michael Wines, Reno Chastises TV Networks on Violence in Programming,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1993, at Al.
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speech and pornography regulation, is that violent programming cre-
ates violent people; violent images inure people to violence and condi-
tion them to its use. This argument, again, like the anti-pornography
and hate speech arguments, says that speech is not harmless, not triv-
ial; rather it constructs us, it makes us who we are. And they hold, as
a result, that speech must be sometimes regulated to protect the lib-
erty, including the expressive liberty, of those who are exposed to it.
Fifth and finally, as an example of this flip-flop in the politics of free
speech, consider the recent issue of demonstrations against abortion
in the immediate vicinity of abortion clinics. The recently enacted
federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act,24 as well as vari-
ous local "bubble" ordinances passed by local municipalities, 25 have
been passed with the aim of preventing anti-abortion demonstrations
from obstructing patient access or escalating into violence.
The concern with terrorism in this context is a real one, of course, as
illustrated by the recent killings of doctors and other workers at abor-
tion clinics in Florida and Massachusetts. 26 But there have been other
speech movements that people said would be bound up inextricably
with violence. And it's no accident that Randall Terry, the leader of
Operation Rescue, cites as precedent some of the demonstrations that
were advanced in the cause of racial civil rights.27 Operation Rescue
and other anti-abortion groups say that laws limiting their demonstra-
tions stray from the appropriate realm of violence and conduct and
obstruction and blockading, into the inappropriate realm of their
speech-demonstrations, pickets, placards, chants, prayers. They say
they are being singled out for expressing an unpopular viewpoint and
that loose predictions that protest will turn violent should no more
stop Randall Terry from peaceful demonstration, as long as it is peace-
ful, than they once did Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.
Liberal advocacy groups who have joined many unpopular speak-
ers, including others on the right, have been loathe to join these
speakers as amici curiae in court. This is understandable in light of
the countervailing interest in abortion cases that many libertarians
support. But it is striking that the polarity of the free speech debate
here is so reversed from what one might have expected in the past.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
25. See, eg., San Diego, Cal., Mun. Code § 52.1001 (1993); San Jose, Cal., Code
§ 10.08.030 (1993); Boulder, Colo., Rev. Code § 5-3-10 (1981 & Supp. 1987).
26. See Christopher B. Daly, Gunman Kills 2, Wounds 5 in Attack on Abortion
Clinics; Suspect in Boston-Area Shootings Escapes, The Wash. Post, Dec. 31, 1994, at
Al (chronicling shootings at abortion clinics during the past two years).
27. See Paul Richter, Clinton Signs Law Banning Abortion Clinic Blockades, LA.
Tunes, May 27, 1994, at 20 (quoting Randall Terry as stating: "If Bill Clinton had
signed a bill like this in the 1960s, there never would have been sit-ins at lunch coun-
ters in the South.").
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Thus, when the Supreme Court upheld several speech restrictions in
a Florida abortion clinic injunction last July,28 it was striking that it
was the so-called "conservative" Justice Scalia who wrote a scathing
dissent in support of the protesters29 and the so-called "liberal" Justice
Stevens who would have gone furthest in upholding the power of the
state to regulate speech.30
So much for the evidence that free speech has undergone a shift in
political valence. Now, let me try to give an account of the intellectual
foundations that might underlie this shift.
To oversimplify greatly, the now-conventional free speech consen-
sus can be boiled down to three basic and fundamental distinctions:
the distinction between mind and body, the distinction between public
and private, and the distinction between government's purpose in en-
acting laws and government's effect. The new speech regulators chal-
lenge all three of these distinctions.3'
What are these three distinctions? How does the Supreme Court
apply them? What does the conventional wisdom say? And what do
the new critics reply?
First, mind/body. The distinction between mind and body-or, as it
is usually called in this context, speech and conduct, or expression and
action-holds that speech is privileged above conduct in the sense
that government may properly regulate the clash of bodies but not the
stirring of hearts and minds. Speech may be curtailed, the Supreme
Court has held, to prevent material harm, but only if that harm is real,
material, and nearly nigh. Domino theories will not do. Normally, if
speech offends your sensibilities or causes you anger, resentment, or
alarm, the free speech consensus says your solution is not to call the
sheriff but to turn the other cheek.
Physical violence, the Court says, is a different matter. While the
Court struck down St. Paul's punishment of racist symbols in the
cross-burning case,32 a Term later, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,33 it held
that Wisconsin was allowed by the First Amendment to aggravate the
penalties for racially motivated punches-two years for a regular, old
28. See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
29. Id. at 2534 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
30. Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. Each description of the new speech regulators' positions that follows is drawn
loosely from one or more of the following works: Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only
Words (1993); Mari J. Matsuda et al., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, As-
saultive Speech, and the First Amendment (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and
the Problem of Free Speech (1993); J.M. Balkin, supra note 19; Owen M. Fiss, Free
Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405 (1986); Charles R. Lawrence III, If
He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431;
Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 935 (1993); Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1321
(1992).
32. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992).
33. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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bar room punch, but seven years for a racially motivated one. 4 The
Court said that difference was permissible because the assault law
punished conduct not speech, or was aimed at bodies not minds.35
Now, the new critics who would regulate more speech and upset the
now conventional free speech consensus question this mind/body dis-
tinction. They say that when your parents told you that "sticks and
stones may break your bones but words can never hurt you," they
meant well but they lied, as every child knows from some early en-
counter on a playground.
But the new critics take the point further than merely equating
some psychic with some physical harm. The new speech regulators
argue also that speech constructs us and conditions our actions; cul-
ture makes us who we are.36 We are, they say, not only what we eat;
we are what we read, what fashion tells us to be, what we see on tele-
vision, whether it be the gospel station or MTV. Culture determines
power, they say; it is not the other way around. Pornography, hate
speech, and television violence do not just cause fights, or fright, or
flight; they actually construct a society that is more sexist, more racist,
more violent than it would be if a different rhetoric prevailed. And,
here's the crucial move: they say that if we are socially malcon-
structed, government should be free to reconstruct us in a better light
by regulating not only our actions, as it already does, but our speech
as well.
The second distinction crucial to the modern free speech consensus,
as to so many other liberal doctrines, is that between the public and
the private realms. Censorship is understood narrowly as the restric-
tion of speech by government. If a private publisher rejects my novel,
I may simply go across the street; that is not censorship, but rather
editorial judgment, market forces, or maybe just plain taste. But if
government bans my novel, that is censorship. Why the different
treatment? Because the government alone, in the conventional view,
has a monopoly of force. If Simon & Schuster rejects my novel, I can
go to Random House, but if the government bans my novel, I may
have to flee to France.
As with the mind/body distinction, the new speech regulators
charge that this public/private distinction greatly oversimplifies the sit-
uation. In their view, private power can be even more censorial than
what old-style free speech libertarians call the awesome power of the
state. If pornography silences women, if hate speech silences minori-
ties, and if corporate spending drowns out other voices in political
campaigns, they say, then government should be free to silence the
silencers, and the First Amendment should not stand in its way.
34. Id. at 2197.
35. Id- at 2201.
36. See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 181-83 (1992).
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We have long accepted, the new critics say, that other inequalities,
such as inequalities of bargaining power, may be regulated by the
state, and so a little cultural trust-busting might now be in order. In
this view, government should be regarded as enhancing, not restrict-
ing, speech when it tunes down the voice of the rich in political cam-
paigns or shuts up campus bigots, for such regulation, they argue, will
in effect lower barriers to entry and enable the voices of the once ex-
cluded to be heard. After all, they say, if we abandoned laissez faire
in the marketplace for goods and services back in 1937, why keep the
faith in the invisible hand in the "marketplace of ideas"?
The purpose/effect distinction-the third distinction basic to con-
temporary free speech law-holds roughly that it matters what gov-
ernment aims at, not merely what government happens to hit.
Government may not aim, under the First Amendment, at the sup-
pression of "dangerous" ideas; viewpoint discrimination is the cardinal
First Amendment sin. Under this conventional wisdom, content-
based laws-laws that aim at an idea or message-are suspect and
will virtually always be struck down, but if a challenged law is content-
neutral, then the mere fact that it hurts some speakers more than
others does not trigger First Amendment concern. Disparate impact
is not decisive; speakers need not be exempted from generally applica-
ble laws.
For example, the First Amendment does not entitle me to park my
car in a no-parking zone just because I cover it with bumper stickers
advocating various political candidates or world peace. The no-park-
ing law is not aimed at my bumper stickers or my political slogans, but
is aimed simply at my car. Government lacks censorial purpose here
and so can avoid serious First Amendment review.
Once again, the new critics find fault with this distinction between
purpose and effect. They say that effects might matter sometimes
even more than purpose, the reverse of the current doctrine. For ex-
ample, a law that has the effect of keeping my bumper stickers out of
a prominent place in the public view might be just as bad as a law
aimed purposely at my bumper stickers. In the critics' view, some
content-based laws might be desirable and some content-neutral laws
might not; it all depends on whether they bring about consequences
that are conducive-or, on the other hand, harmful-to the purposes
free speech is supposed to promote.
Such a view sees free speech as valuable because it is instrumental
to some other end-truth, self-government, individual autonomy, col-
lective tolerance, or, as some new free speech regulators urge, deliber-
ative public discourse. If speech is instrumental to such ends, say the
new critics, then the ends are prior to the means. Content regulation
may or may not be an evil; it all depends on whether it impedes or
enhances the relevant instrumental end. Content-neutral regulation
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may impede those ends too, and if it does, they say, it should enjoy no
First Amendment immunity.
Do these three lines of attack on the conventional wisdom leave
First Amendment law in a rubble? Not if we can answer them in a
way that resurrects free speech. Let me take these distinctions in re-
verse order and sketch brief answers on purpose/effect and public/pri-
vate, and then concentrate on the distinction between speech and
conduct.
The key assumption of the purpose/effect distinction is that politics
will safeguard free speech if we make sure that enough oxen are being
gored. Judicial intervention is required, however, when politically
powerless minorities are singled out. The purpose/effect distinction
remains a sensible rule of thumb for distinguishing these political
situations.
Recall, for example, Lady Godiva riding naked on horseback into
Coventry Market to protest the repressive tax policies of her inhu-
mane husband. Suppose that the government wants to prosecute
Lady Godiva and has a choice between enacting two kinds of law.
The government might enact a law that says "no nude tax protests,"
because it wants to keep things narrow, reaching Lady Godiva but not
too many others. This law will reach Lady Godiva all right, but the
First Amendment will stop it because the statute singled out an idea:
it said "no tax protests."
Suppose, instead, that in order to get Lady Godiva, the government
has to pass a more general law that says "no nudity in public, period."
The theory of the distinction between content-based and content-neu-
tral laws is that Lady Godiva won't need the First Amendment to help
out here because politics will do the trick. First, all the nude sunbath-
ers will come in and lobby with Lady Godiva to try to stop the law,
and, even if they are not very well-funded, so will the owners of nude
dancing establishments such as the Kitty Kat Lounge. In other words,
if you gore enough people's oxen, the law won't pass at all. Singling
out a despised speaker by passing a law that is content-based is easy,
though, and that is when the speaker needs the courts.
On the public/private point, suffice it to say that, even if speech is
conceived as exchanged on a "market," it does not follow that it
should be regulated just the same as commercial markets for goods
and services. Here, let me be clear that I am talking only about meta-
phorical "markets" in ideas, not markets in the products that convey
ideas. Of course, there are many markets for the products in which
speech is packaged: media markets, cable markets, broadcasting mar-
kets, publishing markets, markets for information of all kinds, from
credit to other topics. When I focus on the marketplace of ideas, I
mean regulation of speech or speakers and not of their commercially
tradeable products. In the words of a former Chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission, Mark Fowler, an advocate of deregula-
1995]
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tion of broadcasting, "[T]elevision is just another appliance. It's a
toaster with pictures. '3 7 The First Amendment does not bar most reg-
ulations of television as an appliance, but it does bar many regulations
of what it shows.
Why is that? Because ideas are different from commodities. Ideas
are not scarce in the way that resources are, but of course there might
be scarcity in the availability of means for their dissemination. So in
their purely economic attributes, speech markets surely may be regu-
lated somewhat like other markets. For example, newspapers may be
barred from owning radio stations, just as AT&T may be forced to
allow local phone services to compete. Antitrust laws may constitu-
tionally be applied to sellers of words as well as widgets. If cable tele-
vision has a chokehold monopoly over the video programming that
enters your living room, then perhaps it can be required by govern-
ment to give its rivals, the over-the-air broadcasters, a guaranteed
channel or two as a kind of antitrust remedy.38
In short, a television may be regulated insofar as it is a toaster, but
the pictures on it may not be placed so readily under government con-
trol. Contrary to the new critics' suggestions, regulating the market-
place of ideas for the content of the ideas amounts to a very different
proposition from regulating ordinary economic transactions. A new
idea, or a proposal for law reform, for example, does not trade in pri-
vate exchanges like a car or like fast food. Even if ideas are in some
sense "commodities," they have a variety of external effects that make
them unlike items typically made for personal consumption.39
On the one hand, ideas are often a kind of public "good," like clean
air or national defense, that can confer benefit on many persons other
than their immediate purchasers or consumers. We all can pass on the
ideas we read in books to our family, friends, and others for free, or
even overhear them in the subway. If that is the case, the producer of
the idea will never capture its benefit from us.
But ideas, conversely, can also be a public "bad," by which the pro-
ducer causes external harms for which he never has to pay. For exam-
ple, even if a race-baiter speaks only to his followers in the paying
audience, minority citizens living in the town alongside them may suf-
fer anger, and even loss of productivity, just from knowing that his
speech or his goose-stepping march is taking place within their midst.
For these reasons, we might expect regulation of the so-called "mar-
ketplace of ideas" to be a good deal trickier than the regulation of air
37. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 212 (1993) (citing Bernard D.
Nossiter, The FCC's Big Giveaway Show, The Nation, Oct. 26, 1985, at 402 (quoting
Mark Fowler)).
38. See Thrner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2468 (1994).
39. See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the
First Amendment, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 558-59 (1991).
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travel, or trucking, or industrial pollution, as if they were not already
tricky enough.
Even if the analogy between ideas and commodities were more per-
fect, there might still be institutional reasons to mistrust government
regulation of speech more than of other goods and services.10 For ex-
ample, the incumbent regime might be prone to exaggerate the dan-
gers of its ideological competitors in order to keep itself in power,
provided there are no term limits to stand in its way. The stakes of
making errors about your opponents can sometimes literally be quite
high. Hence, Justice Brandeis' admonition about ancient Salem, that
"[m]en feared witches and burnt women,"'" a history that he thought
counseled in favor of liberal toleration of allegedly subversive political
dissent.42
One might object that this danger is hardly confined to the regula-
tion of speech. Incumbents might also be self-dealing in the realm of
economic regulation. There, too, they might favor their friends and
punish their enemies, especially if campaigns continue to be privately
financed. But at least in that sphere there is more potential for the
interests of different groups to even out over time. Government
might have a more systemic interest in quashing dissenter opposition
across the board.
Furthermore, speech might have a tendency to lead regulation to
backfire. It just might not work to regulate it the way we regulate
other goods, which might tell us something about its different nature.
Consider the "banned in Boston" phenomenon. Censor something
and demand increases. In other words, the public may have an incor-
rigible taste for controversy that causes censorship to have perverse
effects.
For example, recall how Senator Jesse Helms and others led a vigor-
ous political war against the National Endowment for the Arts, claim-
ing that a small taxpayer subsidy of a posthumous exhibit of Robert
Mapplethorpe's photographs violated the taxpayers' right to be free of
subsidizing "blasphemy" and "smut. '4 3 Robert Mapplethorpe was not
a household word at the beginning of the controversy, but he certainly
was at the end. And the price of Mapplethorpe photos inflated con-
siderably as a result.
Finally, the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor may simply be mis-
conceived at its core." Consider that when we speak our ideas, we
40. See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 Wn. & Mary L.
Rev. 1, 5-6 (1989).
41. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
43. See Marjorie Heins, Sex, Sin and Blasphemy: A Guide to America's Censor-
ship Wars 129 (1993).
44. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market Rhetoric and Reality: Commodification in
Words and the World (forthcoming 1995).
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might not, properly understood, be "selling" them to others at all. We
are not just putting out information as a datum on the basis of which
others might act according to their existing welfare functions. There
may be a difference in kind, not degree, one might argue, between,
wearing a T-shirt with a protest message, which is protected by our
current First Amendment,45 and mass merchandising piles of T-shirts
on public streets, "seven shirts for $20." Of course, sales of T-shirts,
as of books or televisions, may facilitate speech, but speech is not the
same as selling.
In short, when we speak we try to govern others, to change their
preferences, rather than merely to ascertain and satisfy them. For that
reason, the analogy to market regulation, whether you are for it or
against it, might be simply misguided in the marketplace of ideas.
Let me turn last to the mind/body distinction, the distinction with
which I began, and elaborate some replies here to the new speech
regulators' claims.
To recap briefly, current First Amendment law gives speech more
leeway than conduct.46 Now the time has come to ask why.
The answer cannot be, even for a First Amendment devotee, that
speech is always and necessarily less harmful than conduct, for that
plainly is not so. Imagine, for example, that a well-financed group of
bigots purchased vast amounts of air time on television and radio to
beam into a community around-the-clock messages claiming that
some minority religious or racial group was "dirty" or "dangerous" or
"the source of all evils in the land." 47 Surely, such an insidious cam-
paign of malicious propaganda could harm the local members of the
targeted group far more gravely than a single instance of a racially
motivated punch. And the harm would not be solely psychic, for the
propaganda campaign might stimulate numerous listeners to fire
members of the targeted groups from their jobs, exclude them from
restaurants and stores, or even beat them to a pulp. Those responsive
actions, of course, would themselves be punishable under assault or
anti-discrimination laws. But if harm were the only issue here, one
might well attempt to nip the problem in the bud by ordering that
propaganda off the air.
Likewise, the answer cannot be that speech is always and necessar-
ily more "private" or self-regarding than conduct is. Speech is not
psychologically interior, like conscience. Nor is it conventionally
shielded from public contemplation, like acts of sex or procreation.
Justice Douglas, for example, once captured the spatial as well as the
decisional sense of the right to reproductive privacy when he wrote
45. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
46. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (stating that governments may
regulate expressive conduct more freely than they may regulate the written or spoken
word).
47. See Radin, supra note 44.
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that anticontraception laws violated the "sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms"4-a reminder that the mind/body distinction alone can-
not mark the outer limits of government.
But speech is neither interior like conscience nor private like sex.
Speech, by definition, depends on interaction with others. It takes
two to tango, and at least two to have free speech. Speech implicates
even more than the duet of a willing listener and a willing speaker.
For one thing, speech depends on language, which is a collective
social creation over time. For another, the concepts and ideas that we
deploy likewise come from a collective culture, an accretion of past
lives in which we are steeped and educated, whether we like it or not.
Even if we adapt and refashion these ideas and concepts through our
own creative endeavors, we do not invent them ourselves out of noth-
ing, in a personal equivalent of the "Big Bang."
Finally, speech is generally directed at others whom we seek to per-
suade or govern. Even when we talk to ourselves or sing in the
shower, there is always an imagined, or remembered, or desired audi-
ence. In short, the existing mind/body distinction in free speech law
cannot be explained on the ground that speech is too private, too inte-
rior, or too secret, to fall within the regulatory jurisdiction of the state.
If speech is not harmless and not private, then why does the First
Amendment put government regulation of speech, as opposed to con-
duct, to such demanding tests? The new speech regulators suggest
that once it is admitted that speech has any public consequences, then
the jig is up and the free speech principle must fall. They would pro-
tect both speech and conduct that is beneficial and condemn both
speech and conduct that causes harm. They would look straight
through to consequences and would not distinguish between speech
and conduct at the threshold.
I would not so readily jettison the existing constitutional regime, for
two reasons: one having to do with jurisprudence and the other hav-
ing to do with the values that are served by speech.
First, the jurisprudential argument follows from the familiar prob-
lem of how we make rules for the general run of cases. To be sure, in
a particular case we might be able to identify the harm of speech ex
post and to deem it the equivalent of the harm caused by force. Imag-
ine, for example, that a bad husband engaged in calculated and perva-
sive psychological abuse and manipulation of his wife, or vice versa,
using words so skillfully for his or her purposes that the offending
spouse never had to resort to fists. If we found the victim spouse in
this state, we might seek to liberate that person from mental captivity,
and we might even excuse that person from crimes that the abuse
caused him or her in turn to commit. But if in the wake of such a case
we tried to enact a general law-for example, a criminal prohibition
48. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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on "verbal cruelty" or "psychic torture"-then serious problems of
identification might arise, and the law might deter far more speech ex
ante than we would ultimately be willing to condemn ex post. First
Amendment law's frequent relativistic adages-"one man's vulgarity
is another's lyric,"49 or in this case, one person's torture is another
person's repartee-reflect a concern that we might make mistakes
and that the risk of error ought not lie with the speaker. True, any
general rule will tend to be overinclusive in relation to the paradigm
case. But, much free speech law rests on an empirical hunch that pre-
dicting harm from speech is likely to be more fraught with error than,
for example, predicting the bad consequences to our health from a
gallon of effluent into our harbors or some number of particles of pol-
lutant per cubic feet of air.
But suppose you think language is not all that difficult and we could
draft better statutes. After all, perhaps we could perfect our ability to
predict harm from speech simply through advances in technology or
social science, in which case we would need some better reason than
reducing risk of error in order to privilege speech over conduct. A
second possible reason has less to do with the ambiguity of language
than with the function that speech serves in our collective life.
Speech, one might say, is the process by which we think together.
Through speech, we forge a body politic governed by a collective
mind. But through speech, we also forge the strands of opposition to
any set of decisions that we have provisionally embraced to regulate
our conduct through the processes of government and the enactment
of law. The free speech principle preserves this continual possibility
of opposition to the state, and this explains our attachment to the
speech/conduct distinction.
Under this approach, it is critical to our autonomy individually, or
to our self-government as a whole, that we be able always to say,
"Maybe we ought to change our conduct regulations." Indeed, we
could not govern ourselves without speech, for it is the medium-the
only legitimate medium we recognize-by which we advance from
one regime of conduct regulation to another. Speech, in other words,
is the currency of peaceful political change.
What laws we enact through parliamentary debate provisionally
bind our conduct, and unless and until those laws are changed, again
through processes of debate, our dissenting views are not grounds for
disobedience through our actions. But, as long as the speech/conduct
distinction holds, we are still free in the meantime to vent, and rage,
and scream, and yell, or even politely argue that the laws that bind our
conduct are misconceived and ought best be changed.
Let me use one example to try to make this point more concrete.
Recall the cross-burning case in which the City of St. Paul punished
49. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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young Mr. Viktora for burning a cross-the historic symbol of white
supremacist terror once and still deployed by the KKK-in the wee
hours of the morning on a black family's lawn." If one asks if that
was speech or conduct, the answer is, it was 100% both, as is flag-
burning, or draft-card burning, or nude dancing."'
The First Amendment issue here, though, was not what cross-burn-
ing is in some essential sense, but rather what the City of St. Paul
aimed at when it punished R.A.V. In R.A.V., the Court readily con-
ceded that Viktora could be punished for his conduct if it were de-
scribed as trespass, burglary, arson, or terrorism under general
criminal laws. 2 What he could not be punished for was displaying a
symbol tending to raise "anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race."53 While the decision in R.A . was unanimous, it
rested on two different sets of reasoning.
Four Justices wrote that the problem was that these responses were
too psychological; we ought to wait for that kind of speech that makes
the listener want to punch the speaker in the nose-fighting words,
not just frightening words.5 4
But five Justices gave a different account of why the cross-burning
could not be punished. Those Justices said that government could not,
through punishment, condemn Viktora's racist symbol for its
message. 5 To be sure, if Viktora sought to act on his racist beliefs in a
variety of ways, his conduct could be punished or regulated, and thus
the force of his racist views necessarily contained. Under prevailing
antidiscrimination laws, he could not refuse to rent an apartment on
the basis of race nor he could refuse to give someone a job on the
basis of race. Indeed, following Wisconsin v. Mitchell,56 St. Paul could
even escalate the punishment for racially motivated arson over the
maximum allowable for setting other kinds of fires.
But what the city could not do under the First Amendment, said the
majority in R.A.V., was to forbid Viktora from holding and expressing
a racist view. The speech/conduct distinction permits his racism to be
contained, but not extinguished. Government may "speak" symboli-
cally against racism through regulation of racist conduct-such as an-
tidiscrimination laws or the aggravation of penalties for racially
motivated crimes-but government may not go so far as to "ventrilo-
quize" through Viktora by making him a puppet for the majority view.
50. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992).
51. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration" A Case Study in the Roles of Categoriza-
tion and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1495 (1975).
52. LA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 n.1, 2546 (distinguishing the St. Paul ordinance from
laws that are "directed not against speech but against conduct").
53. Id at 2548.
54. Id at 2559-60 (White, J., concurring).
55. Id at 2550.
56. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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He can be made to act in, but not swear allegiance to, conformity with
the government's order.
The speech/conduct distinction thus serves to prevent the state from
compelling citizens to adhere to orthodoxies, including the orthodox-
ies we enact in our conduct-regulating laws. Antidiscrimination laws
reflect the "orthodoxy" that racism is wrong. But we may obey those
laws under protest. Speech is the vehicle by which protest continues
as an undercurrent to the governing law. One need not romanticize
the lonely dissenter to see his freedom of expression as of value. One
need only see dissent as a necessary medium for altering the rules that
govern the greatest part of our lives, our behavior.
So much for the argument that speech and conduct should be as-
sessed identically from the perspective of their potential harms. Let
me turn now to the broader form of the new speech regulators' argu-
ment-the claim not only that speech mechanically causes harms,
whether they be physical or psychic, but that speech organically con-
structs us. Under this claim, if speech constructs us badly or inculcates
values that make for a worse society than we ought to have to endure,
then it should be regulated. Here the claim is not that speech causes
individual harm, but that it causes cultural harm, and that government
regulation can perform helpful acts of cultural reconstruction.
To this argument I have two basic replies. The first is that, as a
descriptive matter, I believe that the critics overstate the extent to
which we are socially constructed. True, we do not spring into the
world like Athena from the head of Zeus, as fully informed and ra-
tional and self-determining beings, nor do we choose our ends or the
means for attaining them in a social or cultural vacuum. But we are
not the mechanical product of culture either. We are not simply mass
produced by the invisible conveyor belts of sex in movies or violence
on TV. If we were, then the radical feminists who drafted the anti-
pornography ordinances described earlier could never have managed
to escape false consciousness under patriarchy long enough to draft
those laws. Rather, the structures of social construction are multiple,
like so many tectonic plates seething beneath the social surface. Their
interaction is conflicting and imperfect, ensuring that there are many
cracks and fissures through which resistance and creativity might
escape.
But even if we were as socially constructed as the new speech critics
say, and even if the sources of our social construction were readily
identifiable, it simply does not follow that speech regulation by the
government will reconstruct us in a better way. From the proposition
that we are socially constructed, it does not necessarily follow that
government should reconstruct us. Epistemology is not the same
thing as political science, and refinements in our understanding of
knowledge cannot by themselves dictate any particular form of polit-
ical organization. In short, to see ourselves as socially constructed
[Vol. 63
FREE SPEECH
does not tell us institutionally what to do. Thus, I believe that a
number of the new arguments for speech regulation with a post-
modem twist have a massive non sequitur at their core. Why trust the
state-the very source of some of the bad, old social structures-to
get the new ideology right? There might be strong reasons to distrust
the state in reordering our ideological preferences, even if we trust it
to solve other problems in our collective life.
Using the state to change culture before power in an unequal world
can often backfire, for example, if speech codes are applied to stu-
dents of color, or antipornography laws to gay erotica.5? On the other
hand, great change in our history has often bubbled up from below,
through private social movements-the civil rights movement, the wo-
men's movement, the environmental movement, or even pressure for
warning labels on violent or misogynist CDs. Consumer boycotts and
counter-demonstrations arguably have proved far more effective than
any speech code could ever be at attaining its intended ends.
In sum, the death of the enlightenment does not require us to dis-
mantle existing protections for free speech, for the speech/conduct
distinction continues to serve a pragmatic function. Even if our no-
tions of self-determining subjects have given way to notions of social
construction, and even if we have increased our understanding of the
reality of speech's harmful effects, that is not reason enough to place
control of culture as well as conduct monolithically in the hands of the
state.
57. For example, after Canada's highest court legalized the suppression of sexual
works deemed degrading to women, see Butler v. The Queen, 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.
1992), law officials raided a gay bookstore and seized copies of a lesbian erotic maga-
zine. See Mary Williams Walsh, Chill Hits Canada's Porn Law, LA. Tunes, Sept. 6,
1993, at Al, A17; Carl Wilson, Northern Closure, The Nation, Dec. 27, 1993, at 788.
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